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ItI THE UTAH COURT
WEST VALLEY CITY,

:

F"la i lit i I il -Apjjel I v.v

:

JAMIE HUNSAKER,

:
:
:

- :: -

Case No.

950471-CA

:

vs.

I

! APPEALS

.

Argument Priority
Classification Num1

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an Appeal from a Judgment and conviction for the
offense

*

Code Annotatec
and

Class E

Misdemeanor,

violation of Utah

, before the Third Judicial Circuit Cour

for Salt Lake County, State

Department, the Honorable Edward

i

Utah, West Valley

city

Watson, Judge, presiding,

tah

Code Annotated 78 -21- 3(f) confers jurisdiction upon the Court: of
Appeals to hear this Appeal.
ARGUMEN: FKIOKlli CLASSIFICATION

The above captioned mattei
conviction and sentence ir

is an appeal from r Judgment of

» * imin^l mar-er wherein the i ath

I

I

provisions t

29(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it

should be assigned ~*i Argument Priority Classification Number of
T
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. ' Whether the evidence presented
lega 11 y sufficI ent to demonstrate the g u
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

^r^?
:

herein was

efendai

che

2.

Whether the arresting officer herein had legal authority

and probable cause to stop and detain the Defendant for the purpose
of investigating the offense herein charged.
3.
plea

Whether the Court improperly interposed itself into the

bargaining

process

herein

by

precluding

a

negotiated

disposition of this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant,

Jamie

Hunsaker,

was

charged

by

Information in one (1) count before the Third Judicial Circuit
Court, County of Salt Lake, West Valley City Department, State of
Utah, the Honorable Edward A. Watson, Judge, presiding, with the
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class

lf lf

B

Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (1989).
On June 7, 1995, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker was convicted by
the Court after non-jury trial herein, of the offense charged.
On July 26, 1995, the Honorable Edward A. Watson sentenced
Defendant Hunsaker to five (5) days in the Salt Lake County Jail
and a substantial fine in the premises.
At trial herein, the Defendant-Appellant argued that:
A.

The evidence presented at trial herein was legally

insufficient to demonstrate the guilt of Defendant of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

The arresting officer herein did not have legal

authority and probable cause to stop and detain the Defendant for
the purpose of investigating the offense herein charged.
C.

The Court improperly interposed itself into the plea

2

bargaining process herein by precluding a negotiated disposition of
t
On

July

2 6 , 1 9 9 5 , t h e Honorable

petition therefor, issued a Certificate

Edward

A

Watson,

upon

* Probable Cause herein,

£

h a s occasion t o review t h e within and below m a t t e r s .
CONSTITUTIONAL A N D STATUTORY PROVISIONS
An

interpretation

lowing

and

• I u*

"ilted

Constitutional provisions, Statutes, and Rules " i. determinative of
the issues herein presented:
Constitutional Provisions
Amendment IV, United States Constitution..
. • A r t ni I I I

I

IIIi n
i Il I

I! I ni I ni f t r l i« i "in n « I mi I n i t ni i n

' •

Statutes
Utah Code Annotated 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 .
Utah Cc :l E B nnot at n 1 ' 7
Utah Code Annotated 7 7

-15.
Rules

F
As required by the terms and provision.-, oi Rule 24(1 ) (b) and
Rul*

Rules

Appellate

Procedu*^

I IIH

C

within
Il i m
i mi mi ni

reproduced

r

incorporated intr trie Addendum hereto.
STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS

Defendant-Appellant,

Jamie

Hunsakei : ,

i /as

charged LJJ

Information in c >i u • (J ) Count before t h e Third Judicial

3

Circuit

Court, County of Salt Lake, West Valley City Department, State of
Utah, Honorable Edward A. Watson, Judge, presiding, with the
offense of D.U.I., a Class "B" misdemeanor in violation of Utah
Code Annotated 41-6-44 (1994).

(R.l, Tr.4).

On June 7, 1995, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker was convicted by
the Court after non-jury trial herein, of the offense charged.
Prior to trial herein, and specifically on January 27, 1995,
April 19, 1995 and June 7, 1995, the City of West Valley and
counsel for Defendant repeatedly petitioned and moved the Trial
Court herein to permit amendment of the charges against DefendantAppellant to permit summary disposition of this case by plea
arrangement.

Those efforts on the part of counsel were repeatedly

and steadfastly rebuffed by the Trial Court, and the matter
thereupon proceeded to trial (Tr. 5-8, 4-19-95) (Tr. 5-8, 6-7-95).
At trial herein, the City of West Valley elicited evidence
from the arresting officer, one Travis Pearce, that he had been
approached by "bouncers" at the parking lot of a well-known West
Valley drinking establishment and asked to detain a group of people
getting into a Ford Bronco who reportedly had been involved in an
altercation

inside

that

establishment.

Upon

receiving

such

information, Officer Pearce stopped the vehicle and detained the
driver, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker.

Officer Pearce testified

that he stopped the vehicle specifically at the request of the
"bouncers," having himself observed no inappropriate conduct or
violations of law (Tr. 11-15, Tr. 17-22)
At this juncture, West Valley City Police Officer Corey
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Newbold arrived upon the scene to assist Officer Pearce.

Officer

Newbold testified that, upon detecting the odor of alcohol on
Defendant-Appellant's person, he administered two "field tests" to
Defendant-Appellant,

the

results

of which,

in his

demonstrated that the Defendant-Appellant was impaired.

judgment,
(Tr. 24-

40, Tr. 68-77).
# Officer Newbold further testified that he administered a
chemical test to Defendant-Appellant, specifically a Breathalyzer
Test.

The results of that test were properly excluded from

evidence by the Trial Court.

(Tr. 48-67).

Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker testified that he had consumed
only a small amount of alcohol on the evening in question, that he
was in no wise impaired and that the "field tests" relied upon by
the City herein were administered
conditions.

under the most adverse of

(Tr. 90-123).

Mr. Hunsaker1s wife, April Hunsaker, testified that she picked
up her husband at the West Valley City Police Department shortly
after his arrest herein, that he appeared to be "normal" at such
time and that he evidenced no unusual conduct or impairment when
she saw him.

(Tr. 124-135).

At trial herein, and at the subsequent sentencing proceedings
had on July 26, 1995, the Defendant-Appellant argued:
A.

The evidence presented at trial herein was legally

insufficient to demonstrate the guilt of Defendant of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

The arresting officer herein did not have legal

5

authority and probable cause to stop and detain the Defendant for
the purpose of investigating the offense herein charged.
C.

The Court improperly interposed itself into the plea

bargaining process herein by precluding a negotiated disposition of
this matter.
The

above

arguments

notwithstanding,

on

June

7,

1995,

Defendant-Appellant was adjudged Guilty herein, and on July 26,
1995, he was sentenced to five (5) days in the Salt Lake County
Jail and to a substantial fine in the premises.
On July 26, 1995, the Honorable Edward A. Watson, upon
petition therefor, issued a Certificate of Probable Cause herein,
staying execution of the within sentence until this Honorable Court
could review this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The
presented

Trial

Court

erred

in

concluding

herein was sufficient

that

the

evidence

to demonstrate the guilt of

Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

In addition, the Trial Court

erred in concluding that the arresting officer herein had legal
authority to stop, detain and arrest Defendant.

Finally, the Trial

Court erred in improperly insinuating and interposing itself into
the plea bargaining process herein.

This Court should reverse the

verdict and judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter with
directions that the Trial Court enter a verdict of acquittal
herein.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

6

THE EVIDENCE HEREIN PRESENTED WAS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THE GUILT OF
DEFENDANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
It is well established as a matter of law that the evidence
presented upon trial in a criminal case must be sufficient to
demonstrate the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.
State v. John. 586 P.2d 410 (Utah S. Ct. , 1978); State v. Granato.
610 P.2d 1290 (Utah S. Ct., 1980).
An appellate Court, in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, on the above standard, to demonstrate the guilt of the
accused, must determine whether the verdict

is supported by

substantial evidence and whether a rational trier of fact could
have

found

the

essential

elements

of

the

offense

beyond a

reasonable doubt, or whether the evidence was so insubstantial or
inconclusive

that

reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained

reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crime charged.

a

State

v. Dver. 671 P.2d 142 (Utah S. Ct, 1983); Walker v. Board of
Pardons. 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah S. Ct., 1990); State v. Hamilton. 827
P. 2d 232 (Utah S. Ct., 1992); 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review.
Sections 663-667.
5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, Section 664 succinctly
enunciates the rule as follows:
On review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction, the
critical inquiry is whether the evidence can
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The fact finder retains the
function of weighing the evidence, and the
appellate inquiry is not whether the appellate
Court itself believes that the evidence at
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The verdict must be sustained if there
7

is substantial evidence to support it. In
other words, the appellate Court must consider
whether a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Ibid)
In State v. Dyer, supra. the Utah Supreme Court states the
rule as follows:
Defendant's final contention is that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction. To prevail on this contention,
defendant must show that the evidence was so
insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime
charged.
(Ibid at 148-149)
In State v. Hamilton, the Court stated:
We review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict.
We
reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence
only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently
inconclusive
or
inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
(Ibid at 236)
Applying the above cited cases and authority to the facts in
the instant case, it is abundantly clear that the evidence herein
presented was insufficient to demonstrate defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
At trial herein, the City of West Valley elicited evidence
from the arresting officer, one Travis Pearce, that he had been
approached by a "bouncer" at the parking lot of a well-known West
Valley drinking establishment and asked to detain a group of people
getting into a Ford Bronco who reportedly had been involved in an
altercation

inside that

establishment.

8

Upon receiving

such

information, Officer Pearce stopped the vehicle and detained the
driver, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker. Officer Pearce testified that
he

stopped

the

vehicle

specifically

at

the

request

of the

"bouncers," having himself observed no inappropriate conduct or
violations of law.
At this juncture, West Valley City Police Officer Corey
Newbold arrived upon the scene to assist Officer Pearce.

Officer

Newbold testified that, upon detecting the odor of alcohol on
Defendant-Appellant's person, he administered two "field tests" to
Defendant-Appellant, the results of which, in his opinion and
judgment, demonstrated that the Defendant-Appellant was impaired.
Officer Newbold further testified that he administered a
chemical test to Defendant-Appellant, specifically a Breathalyzer
Test.

The results of that test were excluded from evidence by the

Trial Court.
Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker testified that he had consumed
only a small amount of alcohol on the evening in question, that he
was in no wise impaired and that the "field tests" relied upon by
the City herein were administered

under the most adverse of

conditions:
"The difficulty was is I was wearing boots.
It was not raining, it was snowing, very cold
outside.

I had a T-shirt on, I was shaking.

I had over three, four different flashlights
in my face."

(Tr. 100)

9

Mr. Hunsaker's wife, April Hunsaker, testified that she picked
up her husband at the West Valley City Police Department shortly
after his arrest herein, that he appeared to be "normal" at such
time and that he evidenced no unusual conduct or impairment when
she saw him.
From the above, it should be readily apparent that the only
evidence against Defendant in the instant case consists in:
1.

Testimony by the arresting officer that he detected the

odor of alcohol on Defendant's person.
2.

Testimony by the arresting officer as to the performance

of Defendant on two "field tests" administered upon Defendant in
extremely adverse circumstances.
3.

Opinion testimony by the arresting officer, in part based

upon the performance of Defendant on the field tests, that in his
judgment Defendant was impaired.
Contra this evidence, Defendant presented testimony that the
"field tests" were performed as well as might be expected under
the extremely

adverse circumstances, that the Defendant only

consumed a small amount of alcohol and that both Defendant and his
wife were of the opinion that Defendant was "normal" and manifested
no outward indications of impairment.
From the above, it should be readily apparent that the state
of the

evidence

in this case is such that, even given the

allowances and inferences the law reasonably allows, a reasonable
person must and should conclude that the evidence herein is
inherently

inconclusive

and

improbable,

10

and,

indeed,

that a

reasonable doubt exists.

The case, as previously noted, is built

on an insubstantial foundation.
itself, would

Certainly the odor of alcohol, by

not be enough.

Certainly

the performance by

Defendant on one field test (the second was a "Gaze Nystagmus"
test) would not be enough under the extremely adverse circumstances
of the test.

Certainly the opinion of the officer, based in part

on performance of that test and the odor of alcohol, would not be
enough.

Lumping all three together, can this Court reasonably

conclude that the evidence herein satisfies the standard of the
within cited cases?
judgment

of

the

No. This Court should reverse the verdict and
Trial

Court

and

remand

this

matter

with

instructions to the Trial Court to enter a verdict and judgment of
acquittal herein.
POINT II
THE ARRESTING OFFICER HEREIN DID NOT HAVE
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP AND
DETAIN THE DEFENDANT PRECEDENT TO ARREST.
Amendment

IV

to

the

Constitution

of

the United

States

provides, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .
Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of the State of
Utah provides, identically, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effect,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .
Utah Code Annotated 77-7-2 provides:

11

A peace officer may make an arrest . . .
without warrant:
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe
the person has committed a public offense.

In addition, Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in
the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
It is well established as a matter of law that the stopping of
a motor vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of Article I# Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (U.S. Supreme Ct.,

1968); State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App., 1994); State v.
Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App., 1994).

It is further well

established that such stops are justified only if there is a
reasonable suspicion that a person or persons is involved in
criminal activity, and that reasonable suspicion must be based upon
and supported by "specific and articulable facts." State v. Menke,
787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App., 1993); State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App.,
1992) ; State v. Case, Ibid.

If such specific and articulable facts

are not based upon an arresting officer's own observations and
inferences, it has been held by this and other Courts that the
legality of the stop will depend upon the sufficiency of the

12

articulable

facts

known

to

the

individual

originating

the

information received and acted upon by the investigating officer.
State v. Case, Ibid; United States v. Henslev, 469 U.S. 221 (U.S.
Supreme Ct., 1985).
In State v. Case, supra, a case which appears to be "on all
fours11, as it were, with the instant case, this Court said:
. If the investigating officer cannot
provide
independent
or
corroborating
information
through
his
or
her
own
observations, the legality of a stop based on
information imparted by another will depend on
the sufficiency of the articulable facts known
to the individual originating
the information
. . . subsequently received and acted upon by
the investigating officer.
(Ibid at 1277)
Applying the above cited cases and authority to the facts in
the instant case, it is clear that the arresting officer herein did
not himself have legal authority and probable cause to stop and
detain the Defendant precedent to his arrest and that the City of
West Valley failed to demonstrate, from the evidence, that the
"originating party," so to speak, had the required "articulable
facts" to justify the stop herein.
At trial herein, the City of West Valley elicited testimony
from the arresting officer, one Travis Pearce, that he had been
approached by a "bouncer" at the parking lot of a well-known West
Valley drinking establishment and asked to detain a group of people
getting into a Ford Bronco who reportedly had been involved in an
altercation inside that establishment.

The source of the bouncer's

information appears to have been a radio communication from an
unknown party inside the tavern, although this was never clearly

13

established upon the record.

At any rate, the bouncer himself was

apparently not the original source since the record shows that he
had been outside in the parking lot for at least fifteen (15)
minutes. (Tr. 17-22)
herein

The bouncer was never called as a witness

nor was the original

source of his

information ever

identified nor, importantly, did the arresting officer or any
officer

ever

further.
the

the

supposed

and

reported

incident

What is clear is that, upon receipt of the request from

bouncer,

Hunsaker.

investigate

Officer

Pearce

stopped

and

detained

Defendant

Officer Pearce specifically stated that the stop was

made only upon request of the bouncer and that he himself observed
no inappropriate conduct or violations of law.
It is readily apparent from the above that the officer who
stopped and detained Defendant's vehicle herein did not have the
required articulable reasonable grounds, under the above cited
cases and authority, to stop and detain Defendant.

The officer had

observed no crime, had observed no violations of the law, whether
traffic or more substantial, and had observed no "driving pattern."
He was simply acting in direct response to a request by an unknown
third party, how many times removed God only knows, to detain the
Hunsaker party.

The "bouncer" himself was never identified, let

alone produced, by the City.

The reporting party who, presumably

by radio, contacted the police officer who then stopped and
detained Defendant, was never identified, let alone produced as a
witness.

Indeed, since no further investigation of the purported

incident was had, it should not be surprising that no witnesses

14

were produced.
Thus, in the instant case, the sufficiency of the articulable
facts

known

to

the

individual

originating

the

request

that

Defendant be stopped and detained must be and cannot be provided.
It cannot be provided because neither the "bouncer" nor the person
or

persons

however

information

acted

many
upon

times
were

removed
called

who
as

"originated"
witnesses

the

herein.

Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in ruling that the stop and
detention

of

Defendant

in

this

case

was

constitutionally

permissible.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPOSED ITSELF
INTO THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS BY PRECLUDING
A NEGOTIATED DISPOSITION OF THIS MATTER.
Prior to trial herein, and specifically on January 27, 1995,
April 19, 1995 and June 7, 1995, the City of West Valley and
counsel for Defendant repeatedly petitioned and moved the Trial
Court herein to permit amendment of the charges against DefendantAppellant

to allow summary disposition of this case by plea

arrangement.

Those efforts on the part of counsel were repeatedly

and steadfastly rebuffed by the Trial Court, and the matter
thereupon proceeded to trial.
It should be readily apparent that the actions of the Trial
Court in improperly interposing itself into the plea bargaining
process herein, and in precluding, by judicial fiat, the repeated
attempts by the prosecution to compromise this case by negotiation,
were improper, ill advised and a clear abuse of judicial discretion

15

and authority warranting reversal and remand of this matter for the
purpose of effectuating the mutually agreed upon plea arrangement.
Rule

11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea
to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal
of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.

(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has
been reached, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure of the
tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea.
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
Rule 11 appears to confer upon the Trial Court the discretion
to "approve" proffered plea arrangements.

How, why and to what

extent that includes the corresponding power to "disapprove" of
such proffered plea arrangements is the subject that we ask this
Court to now address. How, why and under what circumstances is it
a reasonable exercise of the Court's discretion to refuse such plea
arrangements?

Finally, did the Trial Court herein abuse its

discretionary powers in refusing to accept the plea arrangement
agreed upon herein?
It appears to be well established as a matter of law that a
trial judge is generally under no duty to accept a negotiated
settlement of a case, nor is he bound by any agreement between the
parties, and that the acceptance of a plea of guilty to a lesser
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offense included in the offense charged is generally a matter
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.

21 Am. Jur. 2d#

Criminal Law, Sections 484, 488; State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370
(Louis. S. Ct., 1976); State v. Adams, 342 So. 2d 818 (Florida S.
Ct., 1977); People v. West. 477 P.2d 409 (Cal. S. Ct., 1970); Frady
v. People, 40 P.2d 606 (Colo. S. Ct., 1934).
21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law. Sections 484, 486, state
succinctly the black letter law herein:
The trial judge is under no duty,
statutory or otherwise, to accept a negotiated
plea of guilty, nor is he bound by the
agreement between the prosecution and the
defendant. On the other hand, the trial judge
may, after inquiring into the circumstances of
the plea to determine whether it was voluntary
and knowing, accept the plea as entered,
unless the result of the plea would be
contrary to statute, or circumvent the
sentencing discretion of the trial judge.

It has been said that the acceptance of a
plea of guilty to a lesser offense included in
the offense charged rests in the discretion of
the court.
(Ibid at 484, 488)
Thus

it

is well

established

that the question

of the

acceptance or rejection of a proffered plea arrangement is one that
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Trial Court.
exactly does that mean?

But what

And, specifically, what does it mean in

our governmental system of shared powers and "checks and balances"?
And why, exactly# did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in the
instant case?
In this case, the Trial Court's rejection of the plea
arrangement was an abuse of discretion because it was steadfastly
17

unreasonable and because it deprived the prosecution of the ability
to compromise a weak case to effectuate the ends of justice.
Further# it undercut the discretionary powers which the prosecutor,
as a member of the Executive branch of government, possesses, and
should be permitted to exercise without judicial interference where
it is reasonable to do so.

But, more importantly, the Trial

Court's refusal of the plea bargain herein was an abuse of
discretion because once all of the uncontroverted and uncontested
good and substantial reasons for the plea bargain were communicated
to the Court, the Court still steadfastly and unreasonably refused,
without any legitimate basis, to permit the bargain.
It should be noted that the repeated efforts on the part of
the prosecution to compromise this case did not proceed merely from
an abundance of charity and fellow feeling. This was and is a weak
case.

There was and is a problem here with respect to probable

cause for the stop. There was, as demonstrated clearly by a later
ruling of the Court, an anticipatable problem here with respect to
the receipt in evidence of the chemical test.

There were problems

with the untoward circumstances of the giving of the "field tests".
There was an anticipatable problem with respect to conflicts among
witnesses as to whether or not Defendant showed demonstrable signs
of impairment.

In short, this was and is the very sort of case

that normally is compromised by plea agreement.

Only, in this

case, the Court, by judicial fiat, precluded such compromise.
Now this is not to suggest that the judiciary does not have
some supervisory duties to perform in the area of accepting or
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rejecting proffered plea arrangements.

But the Trial Court should

not be permitted to act as a "super-prosecutor" in the premises,
usurping the legitimate decision making powers of the Executive
branch of government at will.

And, whenever that Executive branch

of government seeks to exercise its discretionary powers vis a vis
a plea arrangement, the Courts, as part of our system of reasonable
checks and balances, ought only to be able to "check" that exercise
of discretionary prosecutorial power, in situations where the
Executive is unable to articulate on the record reasonable grounds
for its actions.

This, we opine, is and ought to be what is

contemplated by Rule 11 of our Rules of Criminal Procedure.

This

is and ought to be the parameters of "sound Judicial discretion" in
a Rule 11 plea bargaining situation. We urge, indeed importune the
Court to so rule.
CONCLUSION
The

Trial

Court

erred

in concluding

that

the evidence

presented herein was sufficient to demonstrate the guilt of
Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

In addition, the Trial Court

erred in concluding that the arresting officer herein had legal
authority to stop, detain and arrest Defendant. Finally, the Trial
Court erred in improperly insinuating and interposing itself into
the plea-bargaining process herein.
This Court should reverse the judgment of conviction and
sentence herein entered by the Trial Court and remand this matter
with directions that the Trial Court order a verdict of acquittal
herein.
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DATED this 3ft " day of October, 1995.
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
:

Plaintiff,
^

V.

^

*

^

I N F O R M A T I O N

i

i
:
i
i
:

HUNSAKER, JAMIE DANIEL
1256 WAXWING
W V C , UTAH 84123
11/25/72
Defendant.

Case No. 945015055

:

The undersigned, VALERIE J-

O'BRIEN, under oath, stateg^eri"

information and belief that the defend^Hrfe, on or about 4 DECEMBER,
1994, at the vicinity of 3370 SOWmilQQ

WEST, West^Valley City,

Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:
CODNT 1:

D U I , a Class "B" Misdemeanor, 41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, by driving or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol
content of .08% or greater by weight or while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.

This information
following witnesses:

is

based

on

evidence

obtained

from

the

OFFICER NEWBOLD
OFFICER T. PEARCE

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:
OFFICER STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT OPERATED A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER

THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, DRUGS, OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH RENDERING
HIM INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING^%TOR VEHIC""

ComplaMadt

94-64107, MG/CP, HUNSAKER.JD1
PTC: 27 JANUARY, 1995, 9:00 A.M.
March 14, 1995
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COVER PAGE Bt
ORDER OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

FILED
W£*T VALLEY DEPT.

O U l 2 * *<"• *
Cteik of ibe.Clrcuii Couil
By
UlJ Deputy

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY
VS
HUNSAKER, JAMIE DANIEL
1256 WAXWING
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84123

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
CASE NO : 945015055
DOB : 11/25/72
TAPE :
COUNT
DATE : 07/26/95
CITATION /

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS
Plea:
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
13 87.50
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 90 DA
Susp: 80 DA
ACS:
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: FINE -PROSECUTOR SPL
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: SURCHARGE - 85%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

0.00 Due:

750.00

0.00 Due:

637.50

0.00 Due:

1,387.50

TRACKING:
Fine Stay
04/26/96
Probation (Other)
07/26/96
CALENDAR:
SENTENCING
07/26/95 10:30 AM in rm 1 with EDWARD A. WATSON

OTftTE OF UTAH
1
COUNTY OF
im&lMfg*?''***'
I. the undMfottV&irfc # # 3 t o M CM* Cm*.
<J? tn odgjhof 4tann0nf "
tMbMd§ntftiantf,«Mj

HUNSAKER, JAMIE DANIEL

CASE NO: 945015055

PAGE

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor not present
ATD: JONES, TOM
Tape: 13206
Count: 124
Judge : EDWARD A. WATSON
Chrg: DUI
Plea:
Find: Guilty - Be
Fine Amount:
1387.50
Suspended:
.00
Jail:
90 DAYS
Suspended: 80 DAYS
Fines and assessments entered: FN
750.00
SB
637.50
Total fines and assessments..:
1387.50
DEF WAS PLACED ON PROBATION WITH ACEC FOR 12 MONTHS WITH THE
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: SERVE 5 DAYS IN JAIL. REPORT ON
7-28-95 AT 6 P.M. PERFORM 120 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE IN
LIEU OF AN ADDITIONAL 5 DAYS JAIL. DO NOT CONSUME OR POSSESS
ALCOHOL. COMPLETE LEVELS 1 AND 2 DUI CLASSES AT ACEC. COMPLETE
ANY OTHER TREATMENT DEEMED NECESSARY. VIOLATE NO LAWS.
PAY FINE WITHIN 9 MONTHS. ON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF
PROBATION, THE BALANCE OF THE JAIL WILL BE SUSPENDED.

JUDGES GIRCUIT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
STATE Of UTAH
CCUMTY OF SALT
I, tto undondgi
o» UMv Salt Lata
ccftRy that (ho
or w\ ongvui
Wtnecty
'TV Of

V
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COVER PAGE C:
FULL TEXT OF DISPOSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS HEREIN CITED

Amend. I

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
CHARLES COTESWORTH
PlNCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER.

(ienrgiu

WILLIAM FEW,
ABR BALDWIN.

AMENDMENT II
(Right to bear arms.]
A wrll regulated Militia, bein^ norrs nrv to the so.
etirity of ;i free State, the right oi thr people hi keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS IOC (BILL OF RIGHTSJ
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI1
AMENDMENT I
(Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
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AMENDMENT 111
(Quartering soldiers.l
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
(Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
(Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.)
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall pnvatc property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
(Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
(Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail

Punishment]

Art, I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd s.s.)
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail a n d fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
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shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but u p ^
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
189f
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — LibeL]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain thefreedomof
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
lag*
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
ISW
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
isw
Sec. 18. [Attainder — E x post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to t h e civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
18 9 6
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
i 896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
1896

Sec. 25. [Rights retained b y people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
*89fl
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory a n d prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
1896
otherwise.
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
1896
government.
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MOTOR VEHICLES

41 -6-41.

Statistical information r e g a r d i n g a c c i d e n t s —
Annual p u b l i c a t i o n .
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all accident
reports and shall publish annually, or at more frequent
intervals, related statistical information as to the number and
circumstances of traffic accidents.
1987
41-6*42. Local p o w e r s t o require report.
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator
of a vehicle involved in any accident, or the owner of the
vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a
written report of the accident or a copy of any report required
under this article to be filed with the department on accidents
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confidential use of the municipal department and are subject to
Section 41-6-40.
1887
ARTICLES
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-43.

Local DUI a n d r e l a t e d o r d i n a n c e s a n d reckless driving ordinances — Consistent with
code.
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs
a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of
those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or
evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the
provisions in this code which govern those matters.
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs
reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be
consistent with the provisions of this code which govern those
matters.
1987
41-6-43.10.
41-6-44.

Repealed.

1985

D r i v i n g u n d e r t h e influence of alcohol, drugs,
or w i t h specified o r u n s a f e blood alcohol conc e n t r a t i o n — M e a s u r e m e n t of blood or breath
alcohol — Criminal p u n i s h m e n t — Arrest
without warrant — Penalties — Suspension
or r e v o c a t i o n of l i c e n s e — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test
given within two hours after the alleged operation or
physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this
section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
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(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated
the vehicle in a negligent manner, or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in
the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person
exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes
any similar local ordinance adopted in compliance with
Section 41-6-43.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall,
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence
of not less than 48 consecutive hours' nor more than 240
hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the
person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours.
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
the court may order the person to obtain treatment at
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility
if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed
within six years of a prior violation under this section the
court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor
more than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the
person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within
six years of two prior violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in
Subsections (ii) and (7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23,
1990.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of
any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not
less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720
hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of
any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720
hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work
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program for not less than 240 nor more than 720
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion
of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing
alternative to incarceration or community service if
the program provides intensive care or inpatient
treatment and long-term closely supervised follow
through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation
committed within six years of the prior violations under
this section is a third degree felony if at least three prior
convictions are for violations committed after April 23,
1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine
of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160
hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not
serve the jail sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by
the court may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and longterm closely supervised follow through after the
treatment.
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the person to
obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required
under this section may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until
any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a
violation under this section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this
section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence
satisfactory to the department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or
subsequent conviction for a violation committed
within six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior
violations committed after July 1, 1993.
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7)
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted
person to: participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency
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rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things, apply to a
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection (10).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), as the court would render
in connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of
Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of detennining whether a conviction
under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction
under Subsection (10), is a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction
under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered
a prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program* and any community-based or other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by the
Department of Human Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty
or no contest to a charge of a violation of Section
41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Section
41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis
for the plea, including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts
that shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant,
in connection with the violation.
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as
follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of
guilty or no contest to a charge of violating Section
41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the record that
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with
the violation, the resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and
(7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the
purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that
the violation was committed by the person.
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a
person convicted for the first time under Subsection
(1); and
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of six
years from the date of the prior violation.

41-6-44.1

MOTOR VEHICLES

(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension
or revocation period the number of days for which a
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223,
if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
1994
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period of one year beginning on the 30th day
after the date of arrest,
(c) (i) A person who has not been issued an operator
license who violates Subsection (a), in addition to any
other penalties arising out of the incident, shall be
punished as provided in Subsection (ii).
41-6-44.1. P r o c e d u r e s — A d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s .
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, whichever U
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the
longer, a person may not operate a vehicle and the
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
Driver License Division may not issue the person an
adjudicative proceedings.
1987
operator license or learner's permit.
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to
41-6-44.2. R e p e a l e d .
1983
believe that a person may be violating or has violated
Subsection (2), the peace officer may, in connection with
41-6-44.3. S t a n d a r d s for chemical breath analysis —
arresting the person for a violajtion of Section 32A-12-209,
Evidence.
request that the person submit to a chemical test or tests
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety
to be administered in compliance with the standards
shall establish standards for the administration and interpreunder Section 41-6-44.10.
tation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including
standards of training.
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the
person's submission to a chemical test that a test result
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to
indicating a violation of Subsection (2)(a) will result in
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control
denial or suspension of the person's license to operate a
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
motor vehicle or a refusal to issue a license.
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of
results indicate a blood, breath, or urine alcohol content
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made
in violation of Subsection (2Xa), or if the officer makes a
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards
determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if:
person is otherwise in violation of Subsection (2)(a), the
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular
officer directing administration of the test or making the
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act,
determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the
condition, or event; and
Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver
(b) the source of information from which made and the
License Division's intention to deny or suspend the permethod and circumstances of their preparation indicate
son's
license to operate a vehicle or refusal to issue a
their trustworthiness.
license under Subsection (2).
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under
(4) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been
the Driver License Division, he shall:
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and
(a) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecthe operator,
essary.
1987
(b) issue a temporary license certificate effective for
41-6-44.4. P e r s o n u n d e r 21 m a y n o t operate v e h i c l e
only 29 days if the driver had a valid operator's license;
w i t h d e t e c t a b l e alcohol in body — Chemical
and
test p r o c e d u r e s — Temporary l i c e n s e — Hear(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by
i n g a n d d e c i s i o n — S u s p e n s i o n of l i c e n s e or
the Driver License Division, basic information regarding
o p e r a t i n g privilege — F e e s — J u d i c i a l review.
how to obtain a prompt hearing before the Driver License
(1) (a) As used in this section "local substance abuse auDivision.
thority" has the same meaning as provided in Section
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to
62A-8-101.
form by the Driver License Division, serve also as the tempo(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine alcohol con- rary license certificate under Subsection (4Kb).
centration under this section shall be made in accordance
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the
with the procedures in Subsection 41-6-44(2).
Driver License Division within five days after the date of
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age may not arrest and service of the notice:
operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle with
(a) the person's driver license certificate, if any,
any measurable blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentra(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
tion in his body as shown by a chemical test.
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the Driver
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license who
License Division indicating the chemical test results, if
violates Subsection (a), in addition to any other
any; and
applicable penalties arising out of the incident, shall
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that
have his operator license denied or suspended as
the person has violated Subsection (2).
provided in Subsection (ii).
(7) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver License Divi(ii) (A) For a first offense under Subsection (a), the
sion shall grant to the person an opportunity to be
Driver License Division of the Department of
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest under
Public Safety shall deny the person's operator
Section 32A-12-209.
license if ordered or not challenged under this
(ii) The request shall be made within ten days of
section for a period of 90 days beginning on the
the date of the arrest.
30th day after the date of the arrest under
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the Driver License
Section 32A-12-209.
Division in the county in which the arrest occurred,
(B) For a second or subsequent offense under
unless the Driver License Division and the person agree
Subsection (a), within three years of a prior
that the hearing may be held in 6ome other county.
denial or suspension, the Driver License Division
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover
shall suspend the person's operator license for a
the issues of:
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7 7-7-16.
77-7-17.
77-7-18.
77-7-19.

77-7-20.
77-7-21.
77-7-22.
77-7-23.
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Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for
dangerous weapon — Grounds.
Authority of peace officer to take possession of
weapons.
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge.
Appearance required by citation — Arrest for
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and
costs.
Service of citation on defendant — Filing in court
— Contents of citations.
Proceeding on citation — Voluntary forfeiture of
bail — Parent signature required — Information, when required.
Failure to appear as misdemeanor.
Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant to
magistrate — Transfer to court with jurisdiction — Violation as misdemeanor.

77-7-1- "Arrest" defined — Restraint allowed.
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or
lubmission to custody. The person shall not be subjected to
my more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and
detention.
i960
77-7-2. B y p e a c e officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in
the presence of any peace officer, "presence" includes all of
the physical senses or any device that enhances the
acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable
cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission
of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person.
1986
77-7-3. B y private persons.
A private person may arrest another
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his
presence; or
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has committed i t
1980
77-7-4. Magistrate m a y orally order arrest.
A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to arrest
toyone committing or attempting to commit a public offense in
the presence of the magistrate, and, in the case of an emergency, when probable cause exists, a magistrate may orally
authorize a peace officer to arrest a person for a public offense,
«nd thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be
filed against the person arrested.
1980
77-7-5. I s s u a n c e of w a r r a n t — Time a n d place arrests
m a y be m a d e — Contents of warrant — Responsibility for transporting p r i s o n e r s —
Court clerk to d i s p e n s e restitution for transportation.
(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon
finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a public offense. If the offense charged is:

77-7-6

(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at
any time of the day or night; or
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be
made at night only if:
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do
so on the warrant;
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a public
highway, in a public place, or in a place open to or
accessible to the public; or
(iii) the person to be arrested is encountered by a
peace officer in the regular course of that peace
officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated
to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest.
(2) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must
appear in court, the magistrate shall include in the arrest
warrant the name of the law enforcement agency in the
county or municipality with jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the
magistrate under Subsection (a) is responsible for
providing inter-county transportation of the defendant, if necessary, from the arresting law enforcement agency to the court site.
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on the
warrant may contract with another law enforcement
agency to have a defendant transported.
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the
magistrate under Subsection (a) as responsible for
transporting the defendant shall provide to the court
clerk of the court in which the defendant is tried, an
affidavit stating that the defendant was transported,
indicating the law enforcement agency responsible
for the transportation, and stating the number of
miles the defendant was transported.
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution
paid under Section 76-3-201 for governmental transportation expenses and dispense restitution monies
collected by the court to the law enforcement agency
responsible for the transportation of a convicted defendant.
1993
77-7-5.5.

Repealed.

1991

77-7-6. M a n n e r of m a k i n g arrest.
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person
being arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest
him^ Such notice shall not be required when:
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger
the life or safety of the officer or another person or will
likely enable the party being arrested to escape;
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, an offense; or
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately
after the commission of an offense or an escape.
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsection 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for an alleged violation of a
criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting
officer shall assess the communicative abilities of the
hearing-impaired person and conduct this notification,
and any further notifications of rights, warnings, interrogations, or taking of statements, in a manner that accurately and effectively communicates with the hearingimpaired person including qualified interpreters, lip
reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with
print-out capability, and telecommunications devices for
the deaf.
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to be
considered by any court when evaluating whether statements of a hearing-impaired person were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
1995

77-7-7
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77-7-7. Force in making arrest.
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after
being informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person
arresting may use reasonable force to effect the arrest. Deadly
force may be used only as provided in Section 76-2-404. isso
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, wben.
lb make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony,
and in all cases, a peace officer, may break the door or window
of the building in which the person to be arrested is, or in
which there are reasonable grounds for believing him to be.
Before making the break, the person shall demand admission
and explain the purpose for which admission is desired.
Demand and explanation need not be given before breaking
under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or where there is
reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed, isso
77-7-9. Weapons m a y b e t a k e n from prisoner.
Any person making an arrest may seize from the person
arrested all weapons which he may have on or about his
person.
1980
77-7-10.

Telegraph o r t e l e p h o n e a u t h o r i z a t i o n of exe c u t i o n of arrest warrant.
Any magistrate may, by an endorsement on a warrant of
arrest, authorize by telegraph, telephone or other reasonable
means, its execution. A copy of the w a r r a n t or notice of its
issuance and terms may be sent to one or more peace officers.
The copy or notice communicated authorizes the officer to
proceed in the same m a n n e r under it as if he had an original
warrant.
1980
77-7-11.

P o s s e s s i o n of w a r r a n t by arresting officer n o t
required.
Any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding
warrant of arrest may arrest a person he reasonably believes
to be the person described in the warrant, without the peace
officer having physical possession of the warrant.
1980
77-7-12.

D e t a i n i n g p e r s o n s s u s p e c t e d of shoplifting or
library theft — P e r s o n s authorized.

(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who has reasonable grounds to believe that
goods held or displayed for sale by the merchant have been
taken by a person with intent to steal may, for the purpose of
investigating the unlawful act and attempting to effect a
recovery of the goods, detain the person in a reasonable
manner for a reasonable length of time.
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may detain a
person for the purposes and under the limits of Subsection (1)
if there are reasonable grounds to believe the person violated
Title 76, Chapter 6, P a r t 8, Library Theft.
1987

77-7-13. Arrest without warrant by peace officer —
Reasonable grounds, what constitutes — Exemption from civil or criminal liability.
( D A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, any person
he has reasonable ground to believe has committed a theft
under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft, or of goods
held or displayed for sale.
(2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under Part 8,
Library Theft, by an employee of a library, or by a merchant,
merchant's employee, servant, or agent constitutes a reasonable ground for arrest, and the police officer is relieved from
any civil or criminal liability.
1987
77-7-14.

P e r s o n c a u s i n g d e t e n t i o n or arrest of person
s u s p e c t e d of shoplifting o r library theft —
Civil a n d criminal immunity.

( D A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who causes the detention of a person as
provided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes the arrest of a
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person for theft^of goods held or displayed for sale, is not
criminally or civilly liable where he has reasonable and
probable cause to believe the person detained or arrested
committed a theft of goods held or displayed for sale.
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library who causes a
detention or arrest of a person under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part
8, Library Theft, is not criminally or civilly liable where he has
reasonable and probable cause to believe that the person
committed a theft of library materials.
1987
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
isso
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for
dangerous weapon — Grounds.
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger. 1980
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take possession
of weapons.
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pursuant to a
frisk may take and keep it until the completion of the
questioning, at which time he shall either return it if lawfully
possessed, or arrest such person.
1980
77-7-18. Citation
charge.

on

misdemeanor

or

infraction

A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, any
public official of any county or municipality charged with the
enforcement of the law, a port-of-entry agent as defined in
Section 27-12-2, and a volunteer authorized to issue a citation
under Section 41-la-414 may issue and deliver a citation
requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a
misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the
magistrate before whom the person should be taken pursuant
to law if the person had been arrested.
1994
77-7-19. A p p e a r a n c e required by citation — Arrest for

failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and
costs.
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall appear
before the magistrate designated in the citation on or before
the time and date specified in the citation unless the uniform
bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or Subsection
77-7-21(1) permits forfeiture of bail for the offense charged.
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear sooner
than five days or later than 14 days following its issuance.
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to comply
with Section 77-7-21 on or before the time and date and at the
court specified is subject to arrest. The magistrate may issue
a warrant of arrest.
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citation or
information issued for violations of Title 41 shall state that the
person receiving the citation or information shall appear
before the magistrate who has jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of either
the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, based on a lack
of territorial jurisdiction or the disqualification of the judge,
transfer cases to the nearest justice court or the nearest circuit
court within the county.
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel serving
the district, circuit, juvenile, and justice courts shall
ensure that all citations for violation of Title 41 arefiledin
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found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to
death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys
must meet the following requirements:
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in
at least three felony appeals; and
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and
completed within the past five years an approved continuing legal education course which deals, in substantial
part, with the trial or appeal of death penalty cases.
(d) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be
grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal.
(e) Costs and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be
paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 77.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.)
Rule 9. Repealed.
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in
single court.
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which
may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense
with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses
charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not be separated except by order of the
court and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction
over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial entity
shall prosecute the offenses.
Rule 10. Arraignment.
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist
of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or
stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him
to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or
information before he is called upon to plead.
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional
time in which to plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time
may be granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any
proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to
arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to
before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived.
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own
recognizance, prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to
appear for arraignment or trial when required to do so, a
warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited.
Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not
guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses
to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty.

Rule 11

(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent
of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for
a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does
not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory selfmcrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in
open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering
the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that
upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement
has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of
appeal is limited.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any
other party has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the
court,
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached,
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for
it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition
should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the
judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.

Rule 12
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(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.)
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indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court in which a case
is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant, without
charge, as many signed subpoenas as the defendant may
require.
(b) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is
directed to appear and testify or to produce in court or to allow
inspection of records, papers or other objects. The court may
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable.
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of
18 years who is not a party. Service shall be made by
delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter
personally and notifying him of the contents. A peace officer
shall serve any subpoena delivered to him for service in his
county.
(d) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made
promptly to the court and to the person requesting that the
subpoena be served, stating the time and place of service and
by whom service was made.
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness
from anywhere in the state.
(f) When a person required as a witness is in custody within
the state, the court may order the officer having custody of the
witness to bring him before the court.
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse
may be deemed a contempt of the court responsible for its
issuance.
(h) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state,
or is so ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for
believing that he will be unable to attend a trial or hearing,
either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the court
for an order that the witness be examined conditionally by
deposition. Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be
compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at the
deposition and the court shall make whatever order is necessary to effect such attendance.

Rule 12. Motions.
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or
hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits.
It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is
made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported
by affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be
raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the
indictment or information other than that it fails to show
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which
objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during
the pendency of the proceeding;
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence;
(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants
under Rule 9; or
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to Rule 15. Expert witnesses and interpreters.
(a) The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon
trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from by the parties or of its own selection. An expert so appointed
shall be informed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy
such waiver.
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be of which shall be filed. An expert so appointed shall advise the
made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including court and the parties of his findings and may thereafter be
such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally. called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the subject to cross-examination by each party. The court shall
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or informa- determine the reasonable compensation of the expert and
tion, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable direct payment thereof. The parties may call expert witnesses
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or of their own at their own expense. Upon showing that a
information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert
whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witprovisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
ness fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the
prosecution.
Rule 13. Pretrial conference.
(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a pretrial
(b) The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selecconference, with trial counsel present, to consider such mat- tion and shall determine reasonable compensation and direct
ters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. The accused payment thereof. The court may allow counsel to question the
shall be present unless he waives his right to appear.
interpreter before he is sworn to discharge the duties of an
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pretrial order shall interpreter.
set out the matters ruled upon. Any stipulations made shall be
signed by counsel, approved by the court and filed, and shall Rule 15.5. Visual recording of statement or testimony
of child victim or witness of sexual or physibe binding upon the parties at trial, on appeal, and in
cal abuse — Conditions of admissibility.
postconviction proceedings unless set aside or modified by the
(1) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse or of a
court.
sexual offense against a child, the oral statement of a victim or
Rule 14. Subpoena.
witness younger than 14 years of age may be recorded prior to
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or the filing of an information or indictment, and upon motion
interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connec- and for good cause shown is admissible as evidence in any
tion with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be court proceeding regarding the offense if all of the following
issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, conditions are met:
the county attorney on his own initiative or upon the direction
(a) no attorney for either party is in the child's presence
of the grand jury, or the court in which an information or
when the statement is recorded;

